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In this paper I critique the ethical implications of automating CCTV surveillance.  I consider three modes 
of CCTV with respect to automation: manual (or non-automated), fully automated, and partially-automated.  
In each of these I examine concerns posed by processing capacity, prejudice towards and profiling of 
surveilled subjects, and false positives and false negatives.  While it might seem as if fully-automated 
surveillance is an improvement over the manual alternative in these areas, I demonstrate that this is not 
necessarily the case.  In preference to the extremes I argue in favour of partial-automation in which the 
system integrates a human CCTV operator with some level of automation.  To assess the degree to which 
such a system should be automated I draw on the further issues of privacy and distance.  Here I argue that 
the privacy of the surveilled subject can benefit from automation, while the distance between the surveilled 
subject and the CCTV operator introduced by automation can have both positive and negative effects.  I 
conclude that in at least the majority of cases more automation is preferable to less within a partially-
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This paper critiques the ethical implications of automating CCTV surveillance.  It is especially concerned 
with questions of efficacy.  Efficacy is a morally significant concept: the  likelihood of success has long 
been seen as an important element in the just war tradition, governing whether a state is justified in 
declaring war.  It has typically been thought that without a chance of success the war would be unjustified.  
Likewise in surveillance: a system which could  not achieve its ends would be unwarranted, gratuitous.  A 
system which could not achieve its ends and which introduced prima facie harms (i.e. invasions of privacy 
in the case of surveillance) would be pernicious.  I argue that there are strong concerns with the ability of 
manually-operated CCTV to produce consistent and reliable results.  However, I show that the automation 
of CCTV risks failing to produce reliable results owing to, often unintentional, embedded prejudice.  In 
preference to either of these extremes, I argue that partially-automated surveillance, in which the 
automation alerts an operator to potential threats, is the most efficacious system. 
 
Having established the moral preference of partial automation, I then examine the further ethical 
considerations of privacy and distance.  These have an impact on the quantity of information returned to the 
operator in a partially automated system.  Each shall be explained as they are encountered, and each shall 
be considered from two perspectives of more or less information being returned.  I argue that partial 
automation is not free from ethical concerns, and even introduces some of its own.  However I show that 
none of these is over-riding of the considerations of efficacy presented earlier.  Furthermore, I argue that in 
at least the majority of cases more automation is preferable to less within a partially-automated system 
where this does not impinge on efficacy. 
  
1 Manual Surveillance 
 
CCTV has a number of benefits over other forms of surveillance.  It has a broad visual scope with the 
potential to cover a 360º area simultaneously; the camera itself is not selective in whom it watches; and it 
provides a searchable record which trumps human memory in longevity, authority and accuracy (Gerrard et 
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al. 2007).  Information recorded is available for retrospective data-mining; may be suitable for facial 
recognition; and can be cross-referenced against other databases in real time.  Nonetheless problems persist 
in using CCTV, often in relation to the operator rather than the system.   
 
This is perhaps not surprising.  There are a number of reasons contributing to CCTV operator error.  The 
first of these is the limited processing capacity of the operator.  This can lead to the filtering of information 
by profiling people or people groups, which may itself be based on prejudiced social stereotypes.  Taken 
together, limited processing capacity and prejudicial filtering contribute to an increased likelihood of false 
positives and false negatives.  More false positives and false negatives may result in a system which is less 
effective at recognizing and responding to security threats.  As stated above, a system which is less 
effective and carries some cost is, ceteris paribus, less ethical.  I shall therefore consider these three 
concerns (processing capacity, profiling and prejudice, and false positives/negatives) in turn. 
 
1.1 Processing Capacity 
 
In 2007 Glasgow’s 420 CCTV-linked monitors were monitored by eight operators, or 50 per person during 
the week (McKinnon 2007).  This is not atypical.  In 2011 Corby Borough Council had two operators 
monitoring up to 67 cameras at any one time and Worcester City Council had just one employee watching 
up to 100 monitors (Corby Borough Council Electronic Information Team 2011; Manning 2011).  If there 
is activity on every monitor then this can quickly overwhelm the operator.  To avoid this the operators must 
somehow filter the information.  However, this process of filtration often draws on social stereotypes in 
determining who to target, which risks the operator missing crimes by non-stereotypical offenders (Norris 
2002).  Operators are also subject to both inattentional blindness and change blindness.  Inattentional 
blindness occurs when an observers’ attention is fixed on one particular detail such that they do not notice 
anomalous events occurring in the same scene (Mack 2003).  Change blindness, on the other hand, 
describes the inability to notice large changes in visual scenes which occur during a momentary distraction 
such as a blink or the panning of a camera (Simons & Ambinder 2005; see also Resnick 2002).  A fourth 
consideration is operator boredom.  For many operators there is little of interest happening most of the 
time, and so it is hard to maintain the necessary levels of attention for long periods.  Taking the phenomena 
of inattentional and change blindness in addition to information overload and operator boredom, it is not 
surprising that operator error can sometimes occur. 
 
 1.2  Profiling and Prejudice  
 
Given the volume of information the operator faces he must filter it to prioritize his attention.  How that 
filtering takes place is of considerable importance as this will lead to certain people receiving greater 
attention than others, and so that filtering should be based on criteria that are relevant.  In their study of 
operator behaviour in 1995-96 Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong (1999) argued that in practice the 
selection criteria used for surveillance were overwhelmingly determined by age, ethnicity and sex.  For 
example, of those surveilled by operators in the course of the study, 39% were teenagers, a proportion 
which rose to 65% when the operator recorded “no obvious reason” for whom he was watching (i.e. the 
surveilled subjects exhibited no suspicious behaviour).  Yet teenagers comprised less than 15% of the 
overall UK population, accounted for 23% of cases in which the police were deployed (a total of 10 
incidents), and made up just 18% of arrests made on the basis of the surveillance (Norris & Armstrong 
1999).  It is possible that there may have been a disproportionate number of teenagers in the area under 
surveillance, and it is not uncommon that teenagers are often let off with a warning rather than arrested and 
sentenced.  Nonetheless, these considerations do not seem to account for the contrast between the 
proportion of teenagers surveilled relative to the threat they apparently posed (Haggerty 2009).  
 
1.2.1 Group Profiling 
 
Surveillance which allows for the surveillant to indulge his own prejudices makes it likely that some groups 
will persistently be treated differently (Lyon 2002).  It may be that in some cases groups do render 
themselves liable for surveillance (certain aggressive gangs, for example, who self-identify through 
sporting unique insignia) in which case filtering the surveillance by group would be appropriate.  If on the 
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other hand the group has done nothing to make itself liable for surveillance then that surveillance would be 
inappropriate.  Judging by the relative number of teenage offenders it could be argued that the operators in 
the Norris and Armstrong study were therefore guilty of inappropriate surveillance. 
 
1.2.1.1 Stigmatization and Harassment 
  
There are two main concerns with profiling based on membership of a group: unjustified stigmatization and 
harassment of the innocent.  These can be illustrated across four scenarios which, using teenagers and 
shoplifting as an arbitrary example, contrast the hypothetical situation between every teenager shoplifting, 
only teenagers shoplifting, some teenagers shoplifting and some non-teenagers shoplifting.  The four 
alternatives are: 
i) every teenager and only teenagers engage in shoplifting; 
ii) every teenager but not only teenagers engage in shoplifting; 
iii) not every teenager but only teenagers engage in shoplifting; and 
iv) not every teenager and not only teenagers engage in shoplifting.  
For the sake of the illustration I will assume that the surveillance is 100% effective and fully warranted in 
the case of apprehending shoplifters.  I will also assume that the facts regarding teenagers and shoplifting 
are known in each scenario and that these facts will not change over time.  For the time being I will leave 
aside the question as to how different these cases are from reality.  
  
In scenario (i) it would be unobjectionable to carry out surveillance on teenagers.  Given that the 
surveillance is effective and warranted, then if every teenager shoplifts and no-one who is not a teenager 
shoplifts profiling would be justified (Lippert-Rasmussen 2010).  While it might be argued that this 
stigmatizes teenagers, it does not do so unjustifiably.  They are singled out as shoplifters because they are 
unique in their shoplifting, but no innocents have been stigmatized.1 
  
Scenario (ii) presents a more difficult case: every teenager shoplifts, so focusing attention purely on 
teenagers would capture all shoplifting teenagers.  However not only teenagers shoplift, so older (or 
younger) shoplifters will go unchallenged.  This is perhaps unfair in treating just teenagers as shoplifters 
when this is not the case.  Other members of society also steal from shops and so teenagers are no different 
in this respect.  However the fact remains that all teenagers are shoplifters.  The central problem here is 
how effective such profiling of teenagers would be: it seems important to ask how many non-teenagers 
shoplift.  We might imagine a city, Cleptopolis I (population 10,000) in which there are 2,000 teenagers, all 
of them shoplifters.  However there are 5,000 shoplifters in all.  In this case the majority of shoplifters are 
in fact not teenagers, and so focusing on teenagers would have limited, albeit perhaps significant, impact on 
reducing shoplifting.  To catch the majority of the shoplifters a further policy would need to be put in place, 
in the absence of which the surveillance would be far from perfect.  In neighbouring Cleptopolis II, given 
the same population and age distribution, the total number of shoplifters is 2,001.  There is one adult who 
couldn’t kick the habit as he passed into his 20s.  In Cleptopolis II the scenario appears to be very close to 
scenario (i) in that every and (almost) only teenagers shoplift.  As such an exclusive focus on teenagers in 
Cleptopolis II would be more justifiable than in Cleptopolis I, given that such a focus would miss only one 
shoplifter in Cleptopolis II whereas it would miss 3,000 (the majority) in Cleptopolis I.  However in neither 
case does it seem as if teenagers are being stigmatized unjustifiably nor are the innocent being harassed. 
  
Scenario (iii) envisages the situation in which only teenagers engage in shoplifting, but not all teenagers are 
shoplifters.  In this case focusing surveillance on teenagers does lead to unjustified stigmatization and 
harassment of the innocent.  The innocent may see themselves as being treated as if guilty, lumped in with 
the genuinely guilty simply because of their age.  They are treated with suspicion owing to the actions of a 
number of others in their group.  They might not know the others or have any influence over their 
actions.  Nonetheless they suffer the consequences of those actions through no fault of their own.  It may be 
argued, however, that it is not teenagers that are being targeted.  Rather, we start with the presumption that 
everyone should be targeted but then those groups known to be innocent are excluded from targeting.  It just 
                                                 
1
 This also does not deny that there might be deep-seated reasons for the shoplifting which should be 
addressed beyond any judicial punishment for the crime following apprehension. 
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so happens that the only group left is teenagers.  While this may seem like cynical word-play (after all the 
effect is the same) it demonstrates the importance of perceptions in understanding stigmatization.  That is, 
there may genuinely be no intention to stigmatize, but the result might be such that those effected by the 
decision feel stigmatized nonetheless.  Furthermore the consequences of the perceived stigmatization might 
be that more teenagers begin to shoplift (thinking that they will be treated as shoplifters either way).  As 
such the unjustified stigmatization might serve to encourage shoplifting rather than reduce it.  However this 
is speculative and ultimately an empirical question.  I mention it here only as a possible outcome. 
 
As with scenario (ii) there will, in scenario (iii), be a question of how many of the innocent will feel 
stigmatized and harassed.  Imagine Diebesstadt I and II, cities of identical population and age distribution 
to Cleptopolis I and II.  In Diebesstadt I there are 1,100 shoplifters, all of whom are teenagers.  By 
focussing surveillance on teenagers there are then 900 innocent teenagers who are treated as suspicious and 
harassed unjustifiably.  In Diebesstadt II, however, of the same 2,000 teenagers 1,999 of them are 
shoplifters.  In this case there is just one teenager who is innocent.  Once more the numbers make 
Diebesstadt II very close to scenario (i) as (almost) every and only teenagers shoplift.  The consideration of 
surveillance of teenagers in Diebesstadt II then turns on the importance placed on the one innocent’s right 
not to be stigmatized and harassed. 
  
Finally there is scenario (iv) in which not every teenager and not only teenagers steal from shops.  Of the 
four this is the only case which exists in the real world.  If targeting teenagers when not only teenagers 
shoplift leads to ineffective surveillance, and targeting teenagers when not all teenagers shoplift both 
stigmatizes and harasses the innocent, then in scenario (iv) such targeting risks both ineffective surveillance 
and the stigmatization and harassment of the innocent.  As with scenarios (ii) and (iii), the numbers here 
also matter.  The closer the numbers approach scenario (i) of every and only teenagers shoplifting the more 
effective will be the surveillance, the more justifiable will be the stigmatization and the fewer innocents 
harassed.  By contrast as the numbers involved fall to levels of many, some or just a few teenagers 
shoplifting, so these concerns become more problematic and less justifiable.  As above, much of the 
justification will turn on the importance placed on the individual’s rights not to be harassed or stigmatized, 
especially when weighed against society’s desire to be free from shoplifting. 
 
A final problem is that more realistic versions of scenarios (i-iv) are unlikely to  remain static over time.  
Hence even if scenario (i) were to exist in a particular city for a particular year, the following year the 
statistics may change such that scenario (iii) now prevails.  Hence in one year a policy such as that 
suggested above may be devised based on the justified stigmatization of teenagers, owing to the fact that 
they are all known to shoplift.  In a subsequent year, in which the individuals making up the population of 
teenagers has changed such that not all teenagers now shoplift, the policy would be based on the unjustified 
stigmatization of teenagers.  The change in the justification of the policy would have nothing to do with the 
policy per se, but rather changes in the group it is singling out for attention. 
 
In summary I have argued that there are four alternative scenarios with reference to teenagers and 
shoplifting: 
i) every teenager and only teenagers engage in shoplifting; 
ii) every teenager but not only teenagers engage in shoplifting; 
iii) not every teenager but only teenagers engage in shoplifting; and 
iv) not every teenager and not only teenagers engage in shoplifting.  
Of these, scenarios (i) and (ii) were seen to be unproblematic in terms of unjustified stigmatization and 
harassment of the innocent.  That is, in cases where every teenager engages in shoplifting the profiling of 
such teenagers does not lead to these harms.  Depending on the numbers of non-teenage shoplifters in 
scenario (ii), though, the profiling may prove to be inefficient in that it could fail to identify the majority of 
shoplifters.  Scenarios (iii) and (iv) were seen to demonstrate unjustified stigmatization and harassment of 
the innocent.  It was notable that this could be the case, at least in the perception of some, even where no 
stigmatization was intended.  Finally I also commented that changes may occur between the scenarios over 
time.  Such changes could imply that a policy which was at one time justified may become unjustified, and 
would need to be altered accordingly. 
 
1.2.1.2 Group Profiling in Reality 
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The above cases of Cleptopolis and Diebesstadt are unrealistic and overly simplistic, yet they clarify major 
problems with profiling based on group membership.  In more realistic cases when the numbers are far less 
extreme these problems will be exacerbated.  Furthermore, surveillance is rarely if ever 100% effective and 
it might not be warranted in particular cases.  One might think here of well-publicised cases of the 
surveillance of dog walkers to apprehend those who do not clean up after their animal has defecated. 
 
In addition to these concerns, there is a further issue of self-fulfilling prophecies.  Through watching 
teenagers more closely, more shoplifting teenagers will be caught stealing and sentenced.  As more 
teenagers are sentenced for shoplifting, so the statistics will show that a disproportionate number of 
shoplifters are teenagers.  This will then justify the further concentration of attention on teenagers and so 
on.  Meanwhile, other (non-teenage) shoplifters will continue to go undetected by the surveillance which 
increasingly ignores them.  Those who stigmatize teenagers will feel affirmed in their prejudice and 
continue to indulge it. 
 
Identification of threat based on group identity is therefore likely to be problematic in most real-life cases.  
It introduces or perpetuates social stigma, places a burden of suspicion on the innocent and risks instituting 
self-fulfilling prophecies.  Furthermore such group identification is rarely limited to particular age groups, 
as in the above examples.  It often includes ethnicity and religious identification, especially when related to 
crime and particularly terrorism (Warikoo 2011).  As a result it seems as if there should be a presumption 
against group profiling unless it can be demonstrated that a) a significant majority of the group deserve to 
be subjected to surveillance (although quite how many form a “significant majority” is unclear); b) the 
ensuing wrongs outlined above are worth paying when balanced against the benefits to be had from the 
surveillance; and c) the surveillance is both effective and warranted in the particular case. 
 
1.2.2. Behavioural Profiling 
 
What then of identifying threats according to behaviour?  Were the target group to act in a distinctive way 
then they could again be singled out for attention while the majority are unaffected.  However such 
distinctive behaviours seem hard to find.  When operators and the police have restricted their attention to 
suspicious behaviour this notion has often been ill-defined and of limited value (Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984; Graham 1998).  Related problems have been noted in police “stop and search” tactics 
which require “reasonable grounds for suspicion”.  In practice these evince a high degree of prejudice 
against particular age groups and ethnicities (Dodd 2010).  This may be because these groups display 
behaviour which is misinterpreted as suspicious by police, particularly when the police are predominantly 
drawn from a different age or ethnicity.  However it may also be due to the poor definition of “suspicious” 
meaning that behavioural profiling can serve as a mask for continued group profiling.  As such the 
problems of prejudice once more come to the fore.  
 
Even when it is not masking group prejudice per se, behavioural profiling can still involve such prejudice.  
As noted above, different age and socio-ethnic groups are known to display different behavioural 
characteristics.  One only has to think of the difficulty many adults have in communicating with teenagers 
to realise that what is normal behaviour in one age group can be abnormal in another.  By defining a 
particular behaviour or characteristic as identifying a threat, there is a risk that one also inadvertently 
identifies an innocent group which uses that behaviour in a non-threatening manner.  Consider here large 
groups of teenagers hanging around outside McDonalds with their hoods up and their heads bent.  For 
many adults this carries a lurking sense of threat, even when no threat is intended on the part of the 
teenagers.  Even more directly, the behaviour could be that which identifies a group.  Hence while some 
teenagers wear their hoods up and others do not, it might be that all members of a particular group perform 
a particular action (say, going to a religious building on a particular day).  As such the behaviour might be 
that which is explicitly profiled, but the effect would be the same as in group profiling. 
 
 1.3  False Positives and False Negatives 
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Limited processing capacity and social stereotyping together contribute to the problem of false positives 
and false negatives.  False positives in this context are people who capture the attention of the operator 
even though they have done nothing wrong.  An example here would be an alarm placed at the exit to a 
shop in order to detect those leaving the shop without paying for an item.  Each person who sets off the 
alarm, even though they had paid for all of the items they were carrying, would be a false positive.  The 
system would incorrectly identify that person as a shoplifter.  By contrast if a person really was carrying an 
item for which they hadn’t paid and walked passed the alarm without setting it off then that person would 
be a false negative.  That is, the system would incorrectly register that person as a non-shoplifter (or, more 
correctly, it would fail to register that person as a shoplifter). 
 
There is some ambiguity as to when something or someone becomes a false positive or a false negative.  
The target needs to be clearly defined to all concerned.  For example, an airport security system might 
target terrorists, but this needs further clarification.  Leaving aside the definition of “terrorist”, is the target: 
1) terrorists about to destroy an aeroplane (TD), or  
2) just any terrorist who happens to be passing through the airport with no intention of destroying 
an aeroplane on this visit (AT)?   
If TD is the target then AT would be a genuine negative for that system.  It is not designed to uncover AT 
and so should not be judged on those grounds.  While the target is simply defined as “terrorists” however, 
without clarifying whether “terrorist” refers to TD or AT, this definition is ambiguous and open to 
misinterpretation. As such the definition of a false negative is relative to the aims and purposes of the 
system. 
 
Similar problems affect the definition of false positives, which again rely on clear and unambiguous 
definitions of the target.  If the security system is designed to locate AT then any terrorist will be a target.  
If, on the other hand, it is designed to locate TD then any terrorist flying to see his mother with no intention 
of an attack on this occasion would be a false positive, albeit a welcome find. 
 
There is a further problem affecting false positives in that there are often stages of filtering before a final 
decision is made.  Keeping with the airport security system we might say that a false positive is any 
innocent who is incorrectly arrested as a terrorist.  I will call this a final false positive.  If, though, the 
stages of filtering are taken into consideration then there will be false positives at each stage.  Indeed, the 
system might be designed specifically so that there are false positives, hence:   
• Stage 1 – CCTV operators look for suspicious individuals;  
• Stage 2 – CCTV operators take a sustained look at individuals from Stage 1;  
• Stage 3 – ground-based agents take a sustained look individuals passing Stage 2; 
• Stage 4 – ground-based agents remove individuals passing Stage 3 for interview;   
• Stage 5 – the arrest or release of any individuals from Stage 4. 
Stage 5 is hence the final stage from the perspective of that security system.  In this case the successive 
filtering is designed to accommodate false positives, albeit fewer at each stage.  Hence Stage 1 might 
involve 1,000 false positives, Stage 2 involve 500 false positives and so on until Stage 5 has relatively few 
false positives.  Each of the stages prior to the final stage therefore has its own false positives, or non-final 
false positives.  Furthermore, while the arrest of an innocent is obviously regrettable, this may be felt to be 
a price worth paying for the evil avoided, provided those innocents are then recognized as such following 
their arrest.  Thus Stage 5 is the final stage in the surveillance, but it is not the final stage from the 
perspective of the broader aim of capturing and imprisoning  the guilty. 
 
As a system might be designed to accommodate false positives at different stages to allow for progressive 
filtering it is not the case that false positives are inherently problematic.  They may even prove to be 
beneficial, as I shall argue in Section 3.1.  The area in which problems arise is when there is a cost.  Take 
first the cost to the subject under surveillance who turns out to be a false positive.  In the above case Stages 
1-3 impose comparatively little cost on the individual under surveillance.  That he is identified as a 
potential target at Stage 1 and then dismissed as a false positive at Stage 3 might occur without his 
knowledge.  This is not to say that such surveillance is cost free.  The suspect may suffer from a violation 
of privacy or an unknown harm as a result of the surveillance.  However the cost incurred increases 
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significantly at Stage 4, the interview, when the suspect is inconvenienced and is likely to feel harassed.  At 
this stage it is more costly to be incorrectly identified as a genuine target and hence the presence of false 
positives in the system becomes more problematic. 
 
The question of costs cuts both ways.  While there are costs to the surveilled subject there are also costs to 
the surveillant.  Operationally, the greater the number of false positives, the greater will be the difficulty in 
finding the genuine cases.  This is akin to finding the proverbial needle in a haystack, the false positives 
contributing to the amount of hay.  The number of final false positives may be mitigated by increasing the 
stages of filtering, but this is costly in terms of time and resources.  Furthermore the later, more interactive 
stages (i.e. those involving ground-based agents) are likely to be more resource-intensive.  As such it would 
be preferable for the surveillant to reduce the number of non-final false positives before this stage, 
especially if that can be done with minimal cost to both surveilled subject and surveillant.  
 
Moving to false negatives, it is possible to say that, to some extent, every false negative is a failure of a 
particular system.  Each is an example of one who “got away”.  However no system is perfect and so some 
false negatives are to be expected.  Nonetheless we should aim to reduce the degree of error.  The degree to 
which we should do this will once more depend on the cost of the harassment and stigmatization of the 
false negative when weighed against the cost of the wrongdoing which the surveillance is intended to 
address.  If for instance the intended targets are terrorists about to blow up a plane then one false negative is 
likely to be one too many.  If, on the other hand, the target is a person entering a country without valid 
travel documentation because he is seeking work as an illegal alien then this, as an isolated incident, is less 
problematic.  
 
Given that there may be several security systems in place it is possible to distinguish between final and 
non-final false negatives in the same way as with false positives.  If one is considering a single system 
(taken out of the context of the overall complex of systems) then every false negative is likely to be a final 
false negative.  Once a person has been eliminated from the system it is unlikely to spend any more time 
processing him as a potential threat. If considering a system in the context of an overall complex of 
systems, however, a non-final false negative is less problematic if the target is located by a different 
system.  He would only class as a final false negative if he passed through every system undetected. 
 
When linked with group membership, false positives can contribute, as I have shown, to harassment and  
stigmatization.  A significant number of false negatives imply that the system is not working, and so there 
are relatively few benefits against which to balance costs.  Ideally, then, a system will seek to reduce final 
false positives and final false negatives as much as possible.  To do this, though, it may seek to increase 
non-final false positives and non-final false negatives provided they come at a relatively low cost. 
 
1.3.1  SPOT 
 
A helpful illustration here is the US Transport Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques (SPOT) programme.  SPOT operates at certain airports and involves the 
behavioural profiling of passengers, looking for “facial expressions, body language, and appearance that 
indicate the possibility that an individual is engaged in some form of deception and fears discovery” (Lord 
2010).  Deploying 3,000 officers to 161 US airports, the TSA is estimated to have observed 2 billion people 
between May 2004 and August 2008.  Of these, 151,943 were subject to secondary screening, 14,104 were 
then interviewed, and 1,083 were arrested (Lord 2010; see also Mica 2010).  During this period the US 
Government Audit Office (GAO) believes that “at least 16 of the individuals allegedly involved in 
[terrorist] plots moved through 8 different airports where the SPOT program had been implemented … on 
at least 23 different occasions” (Lord 2010).  None of the sixteen were apprehended by officers involved 
with SPOT.  Following the GAO report there was discussion in the media and by politicians over the 
“failure” of SPOT to apprehend a single terrorist (cf. Harwood 2010; Keteyian 2010).  This, however, is a 
flawed response for a number of reasons.   
 
The definition of false positives/negative depends as I have shown on the purpose of the system.  The stated 
purpose of SPOT is to help identify “persons who may pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated 
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airports by focusing on behaviours and appearances that deviate from an established baseline, and that may 
be indicative of stress, fear, or deception” (Lord 2010).  In particular, SPOT was intended to “deter 
terrorists” and “counter terrorist activities” (Lord 2010).  It did not limit itself to terrorism per se, though, 
and included criminals posing a risk as a target (Lord 2010).  Ignoring the ambiguity in the term terrorist, a 
“potential security risk“ could thus fall into one of three categories: a terrorist about to destroy a plane 
(TD), any and all terrorists (AT), and non-terrorist criminals (NTC). 
 
Given that it was a surveillance programme based on recognizing suspicious behaviour and leading to 
interviews, the final stage of SPOT should be considered those referred to interview.  Final false positives 
would then be those referred to interview but not subsequently arrested.   If SPOT had been intended to 
catch just TD or AT it therefore produced 14,104 final false positives, namely those referred to interview 
but not arrested for TD- or AT-related offences.  Given that it was intended to catch NTC as well, though, 
these arrests should count as genuine positives.2  If so then the number of final false positives was 13,021, 
that being the number of people identified for interview and not arrested.  This is noteworthy for it is at this 
stage that a significant cost was levied on both surveilled subject and surveillant in requiring an 
intervention and interview to take place.  In terms of non-final false positives, i.e. those identified for 
secondary screening but not subsequently arrested, the number was 150,860.3 
 
The SPOT programme therefore produced a large number of (non-final and final) false positives.  These 
were processed at a cost to both the TSA and those selected for interview, for comparatively little gain 
(1,083 arrests, none of which was for a terrorist-related offence).  At the same time it is known to have 
missed 16 people who would be classed as AT.  SPOT therefore does not recognize AT but it is successful 
in recognizing at least some NTC.  However uncovering AT would be ambitious to the point of fantasy.  
Through profiling behaviour there seems little reason why SPOT should locate any terrorist using the 
airport for innocent purposes (i.e. to visit their mothers).  The alleged terrorists may not have evinced any 
suspicious behaviour and so be undetectable by this method.  It is, I have argued, fallacious to judge SPOT 
against catching AT unless this was its purpose.  However the stated purpose was ambiguous and open to 
misinterpretation.  Apprehending AT might therefore have been the purpose or it might not.  If it was, then 
it was an unrealistic purpose. If not, then SPOT should have been clearer as to exactly what its purpose 
was.  Either way, the ambiguity in its purpose seems to be at the heart of the criticism.  By contrast TD is a 
more realistic goal, but owing to the rarer circumstances of terrorists blowing up (vice travelling on) planes, 
it is harder to evaluate success against this criteria.   
 
1.3.2  Conclusion 
 
Group and behavioural profiling therefore run the risk of creating false positives, resulting in social 
stigmatization, harassment, and inconvenience.  The number of false negatives may also fuel concerns that 
the system would rack up these costs for limited or no gain.  Finally the number of false positives and false 
negatives will be determined in part by the purpose of the system.  It is therefore important that this 
purpose be spelled out clearly and precisely.  If SPOT had a fault, this was it.  The wording of its purpose 
apparently allowed some to believe that it was a means of capturing any terrorist who flew from a 
participating airport. 
 
2 Automated Surveillance 
 
In manual surveillance the limited processing capacity of the operator may cause him to filter and prioritize 
information based on irrelevant and prejudicial social stereotypes.  Taken together, limited processing 
capacity and prejudice can inflate the number of false positives/negatives recognized by the operator, which 
                                                 
2
 Given that 39% were illegal aliens, 19% had outstanding warrants and 16% were in possession of 
fraudulent or suspect documents, however, it is questionable as to how much of a threat these individuals 
posed to airports. 
3
 An alternative calculation here would determine the false positives at this stage being those identified for 
secondary screening but not referred to interview (i.e. 138,922) vice those identified for secondary 
screening but not arrested. 
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has implications for the efficacy of the system.  Were this the only approach to surveillance these 
limitations might be considered an acceptable cost.  However alternatives have been created through the 
integration of artificial intelligence with surveillance systems.  There is now the possibility of a fully-
automated surveillance system in which a computer filters and processes information, and takes action 
accordingly.   
  
Between the extremes of manual and fully-automated systems there is also the alternative of partial 
automation.  I will therefore work with a scale which moves from manual to fully-automated threat 
assessment such that the following definitions apply: 
• manual (operator filters information and operator decides),  
• partial automation (computer filters and operator decides), and  
• full automation (computer filters and computer decides).4 
 
 I now compare a fully automated system with manual surveillance.  Having done this I shall turn to 
consider partial automation as lying between the two ends of the scale presented by manual and fully 
automated surveillance.   
 
2.1 Processing Capacity 
 
In light of the above discussion there are a number of benefits to full automation.  In removing the operator 
one simultaneously removes operator error.  However, to conclude that a fully automated system is free 
from limitations in processing capacity would be too fast.  Despite the incredible speed of processing in 
computers, this is still less than the human brain.  Furthermore the computer can only process the 
information its code allows it to recognize.  For example, a computer might be programmed to recognize a 
person bending near a car for a period of time.  Its code might then cause it to sound an alarm on suspicion 
that the person is attempting to break into the car.  However the computer may not have the capacity to 
recognize whether that person is in fact bending to have a coughing fit, stroke a passing dog or tie a shoe 
lace.  The common sense that humans generally take for granted is indicative of greater processing capacity 




Emrys Westacott has claimed that machines can be fairer than people.  “Highway police issuing speeding 
tickets, being human, are unlikely to be completely consistent and impartial.  Their decisions may be 
affected by the race, sex, class, age, appearance, and manner of the people they pull over.  Machines that 
clock speeds, identify license plates, and issue tickets accordingly will be unaffected by such things” 
(Westacott 2003).  If Westacott’s analysis extends across all machines then this presents a major advance 
over the human operator in terms of prejudicial behaviour.  However the situation is not as clear-cut as 
might at first seem. 
 
At the heart of any computerized system is the code which defines how that system will function.  That 
code is written by an author, though, and the author may be as prejudiced as any operator.  As the code 
replaces the operator there is hence a danger that the operator’s prejudices will be replaced by those of the 
author.  Several commentators have noted that the values of the author, wittingly or not, are frozen into the 
code, effectively institutionalizing those values (Agre 1994; Bowker 2000; Lyon 2002).  Further, while the 
prejudices of the operator affect a limited number of surveillance subjects (those coming under the view of 
that operator), those embedded in the code affect every person subject to the system.  This risks 
institutionalising the prejudice.   
 
No author of code exists in social isolation.  Rather he must rely on research, data and models designed by 
others, and earlier code which may also contain bias.  In describing the behaviour of shoplifters in 
                                                 
4
 Other scales have been proposed, notably that described by Endsley & Kiris (1995).  However the 
Endsley-Kiris scale focuses on aspects of decision-making, while my desire is to focus on the filtering of 
information. 
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Cleptopolis I, a code’s author may thus inadvertently codify the behaviour of Cleptopolis I’s teenagers, 
simply because it is teenagers who are most often filmed shoplifting and so teenagers form a substantial 
basis of the data set from which the author must work.  This data set might simply reflect the prejudices of 
the camera operators, who for personal reasons related to being ostracized at a crucial time in their lives 
tend to focus their attention on teenagers.  As seen, this could lead to the successful apprehension of 40% of 
shoplifters but will fail to capture 3,000 shoplifters.  Worse still, it could fail to recognize this failure and 
appear to be a success.  The code and the operator’s prejudice might thus work together to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy regarding the untrustworthiness of teenagers. 
 
Behavioural profiling in manual assessment was shown to be limited by underlying prejudice, 
misunderstandings and difficulties in defining the parameters of suspicious behaviour.  However a 
computer needs more parameters, and more precise parameters, than a person.  This opens the way for 
more accurate, if more basic, methods of behavioural profiling.  To illustrate this, and the attendant ethical 
concerns, I will draw upon recent work by Hogg and Sochman in using the behaviour of individuals in 
crowded scenarios to determine whether they are part of a social group (Sochman & Hogg 2010).  The 
purpose of this was to enable a surveillance system to distinguish between a bag which is left in a public 
place with an associate of the bag’s owner and one which is genuinely unattended.  Hence genuinely 
unattended baggage will be recognized as such and set of an alert, while bags left with an associate will be 
ignored.5   
 
The model used by Hogg and Sochman to understand the behaviour of individuals is a modified version of 
the Social Force Model of Helbing and Molnar (Sochman & Hogg 2010; Helbing & Molnar 1995).  In this 
a combination of four factors are used to generate a prediction regarding associations: the attractive force 
provided by the goal of the individual, the attractive force keeping those in the same group together, and 
the repulsive forces of stationary objects and of individuals not in the same group (Sochman & Hogg 
2010).  
 
There is limited research into cultural differences in crowds, but what there is indicates significant 
differences in how people from different cultures behave.6  Different walking speeds and attitudes towards 
personal space have been noted and attributed to cultural distinctives (Wiseman 2006; Helbing et al. 2007; 
Xiaoping et al. 2009).  The mean walking speed of 65m/min in Riyadh is considerably less than that in 
western states such as Canada, where the mean speed is 84m/min (Koushki 1988).  Similarly, significant 
differences have been found to exist between Germans and Indians in terms of tolerated personal space in 
high-density crowd scenarios (Chattaraj et al. 2009).  Both relative speed and considerations of personal 
space are significant as they have an impact on the repulsive forces used by Hogg and Sochman (Steffen & 
Syfried 2008).  A related phenomenon is lane formation in crowded situations, in which cultural differences 
have been observed regarding a preferred side, the kind of lane and the order observed (Schadschneider et 
al. 2008).  Once more, this aspect of lane formation as cultural phenomenon is significant in determining 
repulsive forces used in the code. 
 
Alongside culture there is also a difference between the mean walking speeds of men and women.  This is 
explicable in part by cultural factors such as dress and laws affecting access to transport, but also by 
physique: men tend to be taller and have a longer stride than women (Tanaboriboon et al. 1986).  A third 
area of difference is age.  Tanaboriboon et al. demonstrated that while secondary school children in 
Singapore had a mean walking rate marginally faster than the mean adult pedestrian speed, the elderly had 
a considerably slower pace than either adults or children (Tanaboriboon et al. 1986; Morrall et al. 1991). 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that the work of Hogg and Sochman was developed for use in a partially automated 
system.  Its inclusion here is purely illustrative of the possibility of unintended prejudice entering a fully 
automated system and is hence not intended to be critical of Hogg and Sochman. 
6
 “To our knowledge, however, the characteristics of the motion of pedestrian groups have not been 
empirically studied so far.  It is basically unknown how moving group members interact with each other, 
with other pedestrians and with other groups.  It also needs to be studied how such groups organize in space 
and how these spatial patterns affect the crowd dynamics. This is expected to be important for the planning 
of pedestrian facilities, mass events and evacuation concepts” (Moussaid et al. 2010). 
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The implications are that people from different cultures, sexes and ages will behave differently in crowds.  
While most of these differences are seen in walking speeds, evidence suggests that such difference are 
accompanied by distinct approaches to personal space and tolerance of dense crowds (Chattaraj et al. 
2009).7  It is therefore likely that similar differences in approach to personal space might be found not only 
across cultures but also across sexes and ages.  While the Social Force Model accounts for human 
interactions between stationary objects and between each other, it is imperative that the data also account 
for cultural, age and engendered differences.  The range suggested for the repulsive forces of walls and 
other individuals may thus be suitable for Western middle-aged men, yet be inappropriate for women, the 
elderly, or non-Westerners.  Were this range to be built into the surveillance system, these people could 
register as deviating from the norm owing to stronger or weaker repulsive forces than expected. 
  
The system described risks recognizing social associations between Westerners but not between non-
Westerners.  This could lead to a disproportionate number of non-Westerners being identified as security 
risks.  The prejudice of the operator is thus here replaced by the unwitting prejudice of a particular code, 
and in so doing will impact all who are surveilled by this system.  To avoid this one would need to ensure 
that the initial modelling includes consideration of groups from a wide variety of cultures, ages and both 
sexes.  This would be of particular importance in areas of international transit such as airports where there 
is likely to be just such a variety of people using the area. 
 
The picture of automated systems painted by Westacott as pure in terms of prejudice is hence attractive but 
limited in its application, as Westacott himself seems to acknowledge.  While it might apply to some it does 
not apply to all automated systems.  The above scenario demonstrates how prejudice can effectively 
continue within such a system.   
 
There are, however, positive considerations which should be taken into account. Firstly, prejudice which is 
genuinely unintentional is arguably less insulting than that which is intended.  This does not deny that 
effort should be made to eradicate such bias before a system is made operational (just as effort should be 
made not to impose such a system on someone of a different age, sex or ethnicity in society by accident).  
However when such insults occur out of ignorance they are surely less offensive than when based on 
prejudicial opinion.   Furthermore in the event of a genuine coincidence there may be no insult at all.  If a 
system could be created which recognized terrorists by their gait, and it just happened that teenagers not 
involved in terrorism and terrorists (and no-one else) shared this gait then it would be no insult to teenagers 
not involved in terrorism that they were inadvertently targeted by the same system which targets terrorists. 
 
Secondly it might be easier to correct a prejudice in the code than in an operator (or numerous operators in 
the case of institutionalised prejudice).  If so then some recoding can affect the entire system in a simple 
roll-out procedure, eradicating the prejudice overnight.  A more challenging scenario would be the case 
when prejudice in the code cannot be resolved.  This returns us to the position considered above in which 
the benefits of surveillance had to be weighed against the costs of stigmatization, harassment and self-
fulfilling prophecies. 
 
2.3 False Positives and False Negatives 
 
As with manual surveillance, the limited processing capacity of a computer and the possibility of prejudice 
within the system influence the number of false positives/negatives. The number of false positives could 
increase in an automated system owing to the reduced number of parameters with which the computer can 
deal.  I have argued that whereas the human brain is capable of processing a vast array of data in 
remarkably little time, the only data with which computers can cope is that allowed for in their code.  Let 
us return to the simple code for behavioural profiling: bending near a car for a period of time is suspicious 
and so triggers an alert.  An innocuous event such as someone bending to tie up his shoe next to a car 
would then be suspicious to an automated system when it may not to a human.  To overcome this false 
positive, the additional action of tying a shoe needs to be entered into the code.  However we saw that there 
                                                 
7
 “High density” in this context being defined as more than one person per square metre. 
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are other reasons to bend down, such as patting a dog or having a coughing fit.  Each of these possibilities 
needs to be recognized by the system.  The likelihood of encountering false positives, even when using 
behavioural rather than group profiling, is therefore high.   
 
The scope for false positives is extended by the potential for prejudice within the system.  As with the 
human operator, filtering based on prejudice which is irrelevant may return false threats.  Taking the 
illustration of behavioural profiling, non-westerners may be more readily recognized as threatening by the 
system simply because they walk in ways which that system does not recognize as associative.  Where a 
Westerner is recognized as leaving a bag with a friend, the non-Westerner is seen as leaving unattended 
baggage and so triggers an alert. 
 
False negatives similarly remain an issue in automated systems, and their number may also be increased by 
automation.  It is likely impossible to develop a code which will describe all possible behaviours and 
correctly interpret the intentions underlying those behaviours.  History has also shown a remarkable ability 
of ill-intentioned people to adapt their behaviour precisely to avoid detection.  Furthermore attempts to 
profile behaviour indicative of guilt such as SPOT are of little help if an unwitting person is used to carry a 
bomb onto an aircraft.  Generally this is recognized and dealt with by avoiding over-reliance on one form 
of screening.  However the short-comings of new methods with novel technological aspects are easily 
forgotten in the day-to-day, or in the rhetoric of salesmen and politicians.   
 
3 Partial Automation 
 
I have so far considered manual threat assessment and fully automated threat assessment as opposing ends 
of a scale.  In both cases a combination of limited processing capacity coupled with the potential for 
filtering based on irrelevant prejudicial criteria increased the capacity for false positives and false 
negatives.  I turn now to consider partial automation.  Here I will assume that the purpose of the system is 
to recognize suspicious behaviour and alert an operator to this.  This is not necessarily the case as 
extremely expensive equipment might render it more cost-effective to have humans perform the front-end 
filtering.  However this is less common than the situation on which I shall focus.  The defining feature of 
any partial automation is that a human element is retained at a real time juncture in the process, rather than 
after the event as an auditor.   
 
There are two common alternatives in partial automation concerning how the information is presented to 
the operator.  One is for the computer to search for particular suspicious behaviours while leaving the 
operator free to view the same number of screens as with manual surveillance, with reduced attention paid 
to the behaviours sought by the computer.  I shall call this option “operator as unblinkered” or simply 
“Unblinkered”.  The alternative is for the computer to restrict the operator’s vision to just those screens 
displaying behaviours it finds suspicious, using the operator as a second filter.  This I shall call “operator as 
blinkered” or “Blinkered”.  The key distinction is the scope of the operator to find information not 
recognized by the computer.  In Unblinkered the operator has the same visual scope as in manual 
surveillance, whereas in Blinkered his vision is restricted to what the computer wants him to see. 
 
This section will consider both Unblinkered and Blinkered partial automation as they compare with manual 
and fully automated surveillance.  Through the combination of operator and computer does one end up with 
the best or the worst of both worlds?  I shall argue that both cases of partial automation are usually 
preferable to the alternatives. 
 
3.1 Processing Capacity 
 
One of the central concerns of manual operation looked at above is the operators’ need to impose arbitrary 
filters on an excess of information.  Partial automation reduces the quantity of information reaching the 
operator (Blinkered) or prioritizes that information for him (Unblinkered).  Partial automation therefore 
also reduces the need for the operator to impose his own, potentially flawed filters.   
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A second benefit is a reduction in boredom, inattentional blindness and change blindness.  Where actions 
are defined in the code of the computer, it will not “miss” them due to ennui, fatigue or blindness.  The 
overall improvement in terms of attention will not be as great as in full automation, however.  There is still 
some reliance on the operator who may miss or misread alerts given by the computer.   
 
Partial automation provides increased processing capacity over the alternatives by combining the 
“unblinking eye” of the computer with the increased mental ability of the operator.  To answer the 
best/worst of both worlds question, the strength of the computer lies in its tireless watching and basic 
recognition functions.  These are precisely the areas in which the operator is weakest.  By contrast the 
operator’s strengths lie in more advanced detection of intentions which are beyond the scope of current 
computing technology.  Hence provided the computer handles the primary level of filtering, and is actually 
capable of handling that level of filtering, and the operator functions at the secondary level there ought to  
be a best of both worlds scenario.  
 
Of the two alternatives within partial automation, Unblinkered duplicates the work of the computer with the 
operator.  He may see events which the computer will also recognize.  The strength of Unblinkered given 
current computing capacity is that the computer, as noted above, is still very basic.  It can only recognize a 
limited number of human behaviours.  Unblinkered therefore allows for the operator to supplement the 
computer in recognizing more suspicious behaviours than the computer alone.  With time and development 
in computer capacity, however, this looks set to change.  As computers become more able to recognize 
basic behaviour, so the information returned to the operator may be reduced.  This would allow the operator 
to focus on his strengths rather than devote energy to duplicating the work of the computer.  As things 
currently stand, therefore, Unblinkered is a preferable option in terms of processing.  However 
development will lead in most cases to Blinkered becoming a more efficient approach in the longer term. 
 
It is worth stressing that the preference for Blinkered over Unblinkered will be on a case by case basis.  
There are feasible scenarios in which it will not be necessary to develop the more filtered approach 
envisioned by Blinkered.  For example, automated chemical “sniffing” of luggage to detect explosives is 
currently at a reasonably advanced level.  An operator may stand at a distance while equipment analyses 
passing luggage for explosives, the operator responding to alerts as received.  It is possible that the filtering 
system returns a low number of false positives daily which are easily handled by the operator.  While 
development in processing capacity might further reduce these false positives, such development may be 
seen as unnecessary. 
     
Partial automation can also introduce complacency, a fundamentally new concern which is absent in the 
alternatives (Parasuraman et al. 1993).  Should the operator believe that the computer functions effectively 
without him he may pay less attention to the decisions the computer suggests.  The unblinkered operator 
may cease to notice threats not recognized by the computer.  The blinkered operator may likewise simply 
authorise all suggestions without checking them adequately.  In both scenarios there is a risk of too much 
faith being placed in automation by the operator.  In this instance allowing a greater number of non-final 
false positives (in which final refers to the post-human stage) to exist might prove to be beneficial in 
reducing the operator’s temptation to rely on the automation.  If it is known that 60% of the cases flagged 
up for his attention will be (non-final) false positives then it might prevent his becoming too complacent.  
Hence in some cases the number of non-final false positives might not only be manageable but also 
preferable. 
 
I shall return to consider false positives and false negatives in Section 3.3.  It is important to note at this 
stage however that the above examples demonstrate the case-by-case basis for preferring one form of 
partially-automated surveillance over the other.  The considerations of context, purpose, complacency and 




As with full automation, partial automation can reduce prejudice.  While some prejudice may remain in the 
code I have argued that this may be remedied more easily in an automated system than in a human.  
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Regarding prejudice, the combination of operator and computer might lead to one of three outcomes.  The 
operator may notice persistent prejudice in the automated system and alert others to this.  Alternatively the 
prejudice in the system may converge with the operator’s own prejudice and so go unnoticed.  Thirdly, the 
operator may choose to ignore the system’s analysis, opting to be informed rather by his own prejudiced 
beliefs than the computer’s software.  An example of the third alternative would be the operator in 
Cleptopolis (where every teenager but not only teenagers shoplift) who is disposed against teenagers and so 
ignores an automated filter showing a middle-aged man shoplifting because “only teenagers do that sort of 
thing.”  This would presumably be coupled with a belief that the system had missed some important 
exonerating information which would justify the apparent theft. 
 
The scope for operator prejudice is less in Blinkered than Unblinkered because the scope of information 
presented to the operator is restricted.  The operator as unblinkered remains free to look for his own 
“targets” and so to monitor those he chooses.  In Blinkered the operator’s prejudice is only brought to bear 
on a target already branded suspicious by the computer.  The operator’s prejudice can affect the outcome, 
but it is prevented from wholly determining the individuals who should be considered for that outcome.  
Overall there is a reduction in scope for prejudicial decision-making through the increased computer 
recognition of salient factors and the reduced need to arbitrarily filter information. 
 
Crucially the retention of the human operator might therefore reduce or contribute to prejudice.  It was 
noted at the beginning of this paper that the prejudice of operators was highlighted in the research of Norris 
and Armstrong.  To what extent, though, is this research a reliable guide to operator behaviour? 
 
Norris and Armstrong carried out their research in three sites in the UK between May 1995 and April 1996 
(Norris & Armstrong 1999).  The twenty-five operators at these three sites were monitored for 592 hours, 
or 74 eight-hour shifts (Norris & Armstrong 1999).  The retrieved data concerned “888 targeted 
surveillances. In 711 of these surveillances, a person was identified and [there is] basic demographic data 
for each of them (age, race, sex and appearance)” (Norris & Armstrong 1999).  During this time, the 
surveillance resulted in 45 police deployments.  Of these, “two resulted in no suspect/target being identified 
by police on the ground. Of the remaining 43 incidents, 76 per cent resulted in … a warning and those 
identified were allowed to go on their way. An arrest was made in … 12 incidents, that is in less that one-
quarter (24 per cent) of all deployments and less than one in seventy targeted surveillances” (Norris & 
Armstrong 1999).  As Norris and Armstrong state, this amounted to an average of “twelve targeted 
observations per shift, roughly one every forty-five minutes and deployment … resulted from about 5 per 
cent of target surveillances” (Norris & Armstrong 1999). 
 
From these initial statistics several aspects become clear.  Firstly the research is dated, occurring 15 years 
ago at the time of writing this paper.  This is not the fault of the authors, who published their findings in 
1999, but it is notable that no thorough survey of operator behaviour has been carried out since.  In the 
meantime there has been growth of CCTV usage in the UK, partly as a result of government funding in 
excess of £208m for over a thousand schemes from 1994-2003 (Gerrard et al. 2007).  Furthermore, both 
this money and the Norris and Armstrong research targeted cameras operated by local authorities, which 
are “a very small proportion of the nation’s CCTV provision, since the vast majority are commercially 
owned” (Gerrard et al. 2007).  Hence not only was the research carried out 15 years ago, but it concerned a 
comparatively small (if significant) area of CCTV surveillance.  In addition, this area had only just started 
to undergo a rapid expansion which would continue for another seven years after the end of the survey.  
The concentration on 25 operators in just three centres out of hundreds also means that the data risks failing 
to accurately represent the behaviour of all operators.  Owing to these concerns it is questionable how 
useful the Norris and Armstrong data remains, aside from being the only data available.   
 
This is not to exonerate the operators in the Norris and Armstrong study from blame.  There were instances 
of racist language and a disproportionate targeting of the young, the black and the male.  However many of 
the problems were reducible, as Norris and Armstrong point out, to the relationship between the operators 
and the local police (Norris & Armstrong 1999; see also Norris 2002).  Operator behaviour in their study is 
therefore as much, if not more, a factor of this relationship than of operator prejudice per se. 
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There is hence a danger in misreading or giving too much attention to the findings of the Norris and 
Armstrong data.  This is frustrating as it is some of the most comprehensive data on the subject available, 
and yet is nonetheless limited by both time and scope.  In the intervening 15 years, the growth of CCTV 
usage suggests that the situation today may be very different from that encountered in the mid-1990s.  The 
value of this data in critiquing current operator behaviour is therefore limited.  It is possible that some 
operators continue to be prejudiced and erratic when they alert the police to incidents.  It is also possible, 
however, that with growth have come professionalism and experience, leading to a more responsible and 
reliable operator. 
 
3.3 False Positives and False Negatives 
  
Partial automation reduces the information flow to the operator, either literally or by prioritizing that 
information, and so limits the need for arbitrary or irrelevant filters.  This, coupled with the potential for 
reduced prejudice, means that partial automation can reduce the number of false positives and false 
negatives.   
 
False negatives may be reduced in both Blinkered and Unblinkered.  In both cases, what the operator alone 
would have missed, the computer may catch.  Similarly the reduced need for filters based on social 
stereotypes should result in fewer false positives at all stages of filtering.  I have argued that there is 
nothing inherently wrong with false positives so long as they do not impose a cost.  Those based on social 
stereotypes typically do carry such a cost in terms of stigmatization, harassment of the innocent and self-
fulfilling prophecies.  Those based on behaviour may also carry this cost, but this may be easier to resolve.  
I have also argued that in responding to context, purpose, complacency and cost, the toleration of some 
false positives might be beneficial to the system.  This is especially true if those are low-cost non-final false 
positives.  It would be preferable to have more rather than fewer low-cost non-final false positives if this  
proved necessary to avoid false negatives.   
 
To illustrate this imagine a bizarre discovery that healthy suicidal terrorists about to destroy a plane almost 
always walk at 60m/min, while the majority of non-terrorists walk faster than this.  Software could then be 
developed which targeted people walking at this pace.  The operator could function, in theory at least, as a 
second filter to remove the false positives (non-terrorists walking at that pace) before ground-based staff 
intervene.8  However there may be terrorists who limp owing to some prior carelessness in placing bombs 
and so walk at a slower pace.  Rather than miss these limping terrorists it may be worth expanding the 
range of the software to recognize those walking at 60m/min and slower.  This would expand the number of 
non-final false positives, but the return (recognizing limping terrorists) might mean that the burden of the 
extra non-final false positives could be felt worthwhile to avoid false negatives. 
 
If this is true of non-final false positives, what of final false positives where the operator’s decision is the 
final stage of the process.  Once more this would depend on cost.  For example, if the operator’s 
authorisation led to a remote-controlled gun shooting the suspected terrorist there would be a much higher 
cost to false positives than if his authorisation informs a ground-based agent to interview the subject.  In the 
latter case the stage is final from the perspective of the surveillance, although not from that of the overall 
process.  In the former it is final from the perspective of both the surveillance and the overall process.  In 
either case the impact of a final false positive is likely to be greater than that of a non-final false positive.  
As such, and while the core issue is still one of cost, it will likely be the case that final false positives 
should be reduced where possible. 
 
Compared with the alternatives of manual and full automation in terms of efficacy, partial automation is 
thus preferable if flawed.  It has greater processing capacity than either of the alternatives.  While the 
effects of this might be outweighed by prejudice in either the computer or the operator, in neither case is 
this prejudice irresolvable.  As with prejudice in automation, discrimination in software could be 
recognized and corrected across the system.  And as with prejudice in manual surveillance, operator 
prejudice is local and could be addressed through training and supervision. The more this prejudice, such as 
                                                 
8
 Quite how the operator would do this in practice need not be of concern for the point at hand.   
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it is, can be reduced the more effective partial automation will become.  Thirdly the problem of 
complacency also needs to be recognized and addressed.  However this could likewise be reduced through 
training, supervision and in some cases the toleration of non-final false positives (to combat operator 
complacency). 
 
Overall partial automation is therefore the most effective means of surveillance considered.  Flaws remain 
in the system, but when recognized these could possibly be addressed through a combination of training 
and oversight, as well as allowing for  some non-final false positives in the system to counter complacency 
and to avoid false negatives.  Even if these flaws cannot be resolved, though, the partially automated 
system remains preferable to the alternatives. 
 
4 Further Considerations 
 
Partial automation is the most effective form of surveillance considered.  However ethical concerns are not 
limited to efficacy.  What have yet to be considered are privacy and distance, which have bearing on the 
distinction between Unblinkered and Blinkered.  As such, is to these that I now turn to see whether they 




Regarding manually-operated CCTV there is often an assumption that the surveillant and the surveilled are 
anonymous to one another, but this is not always the case.  When police monitor known criminals the 
anonymity is asymmetric.  In settings such as CCTV in the High Street the operator, John, might see 
someone he knows, Jessica, going into a shop selling lingerie and adult toys.  While Jessica is entitled to go 
into that shop, were she aware that John were watching then she might choose not to do so.  John is an ex-
boyfriend and she would rather he didn’t know anything about certain aspects of her current lifestyle.  
Were John physically present in the street then Jessica would have a reasonable chance of seeing him and 
avoiding the shop on this occasion.  Given John’s physical distance, though, Jessica has no means of 
knowing that he is watching her.  An area of her life which she would rather keep private is no longer so, 
owing to the distance between herself and John introduced by the cameras.9 
 
Automated surveillance, by contrast, brings with it a degree of anonymity and privacy.  The anonymity was 
implicitly recognized by Westacott when he noted that machines are less concerned by age, sex, colour, etc.  
The failure to discriminate between people in any way other than the one under consideration (speeding in 
Westacott’s example) promises a high degree of anonymity.  The implications for privacy derive from this 
in that the automated camera will not follow Jessica’s movements in the High Street simply because she is 
Jessica, in the way it might have done when operated by John.  If Jessica’s use of the shop is caught 
incidentally (through random camera sweeps of the area, for example) and the film stored for a period lest 
needed for evidence, then there is a possibility that someone will see it.  However the chances of Jessica’s 
expectation of privacy being violated are reduced in the case of automated surveillance. 
 
Unsurprisingly the threats to privacy in partial surveillance fall between these extremes.   The operator as 
blinkered maintains some access to potentially private information, although this is less than the operator as 
unblinkered who remains free to access a wider set of information.  Indeed, coupled with complacency the 
unblinkered and immoral operator may feel at greater liberty to focus on privacy-invading activities, 
expecting the computer to register any important threats.  As unblinkered the operator still has free use of 
the equipment to cast his gaze where he chooses.  As such, the privacy risks with Unblinkered are far closer 
to those associated with manual surveillance.  Given that this is a concern for many people with manual 
surveillance this should be taken seriously.  However it is hard to see how to mitigate this.  The system is 
designed to allow the operator free access to the cameras and so the potential for privacy violations at the 
whim of the operator remains as a part of the system.   
                                                 
9
 Interestingly, in e-mail correspondence, Clive Norris has suggested that pictures of the faces of all 
relevant camera operators be posted in the areas in which CCTV is operating in an attempt to overcome this 
problem. 
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By contrast the blinkered operator has only the information returned owing to the computer recognising 
suspicious activity.  Hence any infringement of privacy would be incidental to such activity.  This is 
virtually identical to the risks associated with auditing fully automated surveillance.  This therefore argues 
strongly in favour of Blinkered, ceteris paribus, where it is feasible to respect the privacy expectations of 




A related concern is the physical distance which exists between the operator and the surveilled subject.  
Such distance does not occur when, for instance, a policeman confronts a suspect (Norris 2002).  This 
distance takes the imminence out of a situation for the operator, allowing him more time to reflect and seek 
advice than if he were a ground-based agent.  Furthermore, as he is not being threatened he can take a more 
objective stance than one who is facing a violent person.  At the same time distance impacts on the 
operator’s situation awareness, limiting it to what he can see on the screen(s).  He might not be privy to 
aural information which could impact the interpretation of a situation.  He may also deliberate for too long 
over a situation when, had he been on the ground, he would have intervened more rapidly. 
 
A further problem is that distance can grant one’s prejudices immunity from being challenged by the 
realities on the ground.  The operator might falsely believe, for example, that an Asian is more likely to 
commit a crime than a Caucasian.  Without face-to-face contact with an Asian person, though, the operator 
might never have cause to review this opinion.  On the other hand, the distance also eliminates some level 
of discretion which is available to the officer on the ground.  This might be an improvement on ground-
based enforcement in which stereotyping may play an even greater role than in the control room.   
 
When applied to more automated systems, however, the role of the human surveillant is reduced.  Due to 
the binary nature of computers, one result of automation can be the over-simplification of society.  This 
might not be problematic when determining whether someone has sufficient money on their Oyster card to 
use the Underground.  Were such an approach to become pervasive, however, it could exacerbate the 
stratification of society between the haves and have-nots.  Gaining valid tokens of access (e.g. an Oyster 
card to use the Underground, which has gone “cashless”) might depend on having other tokens (e.g. a 
credit card), which in turn rely on other tokens (e.g. a place of residence), and so on.  While a human 
system might allow room for subtlety, explanation or pleading, an automated system will not (thus 
preventing the homeless person from using the Underground).  As such the differences in society risk 
become more cemented rather than more fluid. 
 
As a means of social control, allowing or preventing access to areas of society, Blinkered risks denying the 
surveilled an opportunity for interaction.  This is especially true if his actions are not recognized by the 
system as suspicious and so are not returned to the operator.  This removes the possibility of negotiation, 
subtlety and discretion from one area of human interaction.  While scope for negotiation is already limited 
in the case of CCTV, the operator does retain some capacity for discretion which a computer does not.  A 
surveilled subject might even make an appeal to a human-operated camera to be allowed access; such 
appeals would be wasted on more automated systems. 
 
Blinkered therefore risks limiting opportunities for negotiation, subtlety and discretion.  To gain the 
computer’s (and thereafter the operator’s) attention the surveilled subject might have to act suspiciously.  
This despite the fact that he has no intention of wrongdoing, and might suffer repercussions for his actions.  
Without the scope for these interactions one party is disempowered.  Without scope for such interaction in 
an automated system a similar disempowerment may be introduced across the system.   
 
By contrast the expanded scope of the operator in Unblinkered allows for some discretion absent from 
Blinkered.  The consideration of distance can therefore be seen as a companion to considerations of 
prejudice.  As the operator loses discretionary powers he has less scope for making prejudiced decisions but 
also less ability to make sympathetic decisions.  Hence Westacott’s example of automated speeding 
detection referred to above.  Discretion thus works both ways.  Blinkered, being more automated than 
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Unblinkered, allows for relatively little interaction and so increases the distance between operator and 
surveilled subject.   
 
4.3 Privacy vs. Distance 
 
The related considerations of privacy and distance are therefore relevant to partial automation.  With 
greater automation comes greater privacy.  However the distance between surveilled subject and operator 
also increases with automation such that there is less scope for discretionary behaviour or human 
interaction.  Blinkered is preferable to Unblinkered in terms of privacy.  Distance, a more morally 
ambiguous concern than privacy, increases with Blinkered with both positive and negative repercussions.  
Most notably the scope for discretion is reduced, limiting opportunities for interaction but also for 
prejudice.  There may be a cementing of social mobility, but also less scope for impassioned decision-
making. 
 
If concerns relating to distance cancel each other out, but privacy remains an issue, then Blinkered should 
be seen as generally preferable to Unblinkered.  Privacy violations are curtailed and while some negative 
effects are felt from distance these are counter-balanced by the positive, especially the reduction in scope 
for prejudice.  These are not hard-and-fast conclusions, however.  Different cases will preference different 
solutions.  Where human actions are likely to be varied and unpredictable, coupled with poor computing 
capacity, a broadly homogenous target set and limited scope for privacy violations the unblinkered 
approach may be preferable.  It would be more efficient at recognising threats, require less development, 
counter complacency and risk less prejudicial decision making based on social stereotypes or voyeurism.  
By contrast more effective processing capacity of automation coupled with more predictable human 
behaviour, heterogeneous people groups and/or situations in which a subject might expect greater privacy 
will lead to situations in which more blinkered options would be preferable. 
 
The limiting factor in Blinkered remains its efficacy based on the code’s capacity to recognize suspicious 
behaviour.  As this is currently low it would be better for more information to reach the operator rather than 
less.  Nonetheless, the ethical benefits of Blinkered imply that this, if its processing capacity could be 
improved, is preferable to Unblinkered.  Furthermore, as processing capacity and recognition functions 
improve, so the quantity of information returned to the operator may be refined and reduced.  What remains 
important, however, is that the human operator is not removed from the system.  To do so would be to 
demonstrate complacency on a societal level in placing too great a faith in the ability of computers to do 




In this paper I have considered the ethical concerns arising from automating surveillance.  In this I have 
looked at three alternatives: manual, automated, and partially-automated surveillance.  In the case of 
manual surveillance I argued that there are a number of ethical concerns, not least being the poor 
processing capacity of the human operator.  A tendency to rely on profiling to aid flawed processing, 
coupled with personal prejudice, was shown to result in likely unjustified stigmatization and harassment, as 
well as inefficient and potentially costly surveillance. 
 
Manual surveillance was then contrasted with fully-automated surveillance in which a computer filters 
information and decides on the action to take based on that information.  While the computer is free from 
certain constraints on human operators such as boredom and inattentional blindness, fully-automated 
surveillance is not free from processing concerns.  In particular it was seen that computers may lack a 
subtlety of awareness which a human would likely describe as common sense.  Drawing on research by 
Sochman and Hogg I also demonstrated that computerized systems were not necessarily free from 
prejudice.  Once more the combination of limited processing and the potential for prejudice indicated that 
false positives and false negatives would likewise continue to be an issue for fully-automated systems. 
 
I then looked at partial automation in which the computer filters information and passes this to a human 
operator for action.  Two alternatives were considered: blinkered in which the operator only sees that 
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information presented to him by the computer and unblinkered in which the operator remains free to scan 
monitors but has his attention alerted to particular events by the automated system.  In terms of processing 
capacity, blinkered was seen to have the advantage of limiting a duplication of effort, but the current state 
of computer processing led to the conclusion that unblinkered was for the present the preferable option.  
Both prejudice and false positives/negatives remain a concern for partial automation.  In the case of the 
former I argued that the combination of operator and computer might either reduce or contribute to 
prejudice.  Once more, blinkered was seen to be preferable in this respect, although the limited availability 
of reliable data meant that the degree to which prejudice was a real issue in surveillance systems is 
underdetermined.  Finally it was noted that false positives and false negatives would be reduced in 
partially-automated systems. 
 
In conclusion I believe that partially-automated surveillance systems are ethically preferable to either 
manually-operated or fully-automated systems.  They are stronger in terms of processing capacity and, 
while prejudice and false positives/negatives remain, the concerns seem less significant than those 
associated with manual surveillance.  As to which form of partially-automated system is preferable, it 
would seem that in a perfect world blinkered would generally be better than unblinkered.  However the 
current state of computer processing means that a blinkered system would likely incur too many false 
negatives to be effective.  Given current conditions, then, it seems as if an unblinkered partially-automated 
system would, in most cases, be the ethically preferable option. 
 
6 Further Research 
 
This paper has touched on some of the issues arising from the automation of surveillance.  Among these I 
have raised concerns relating to the manner in which prejudice can unwittingly enter an automated system, 
the potential for which was shown in the case of SUBITO.  Designed for partial automation, the SUBITO 
project developed automated tools for aiding the human operator.  In addition to assessing behaviour of 
individuals in crowded situations, algorithms were also developed to predict behaviour and automate facial 
recognition.  Neither of these are unique to SUBITO (Baker et al. 2008; Huang et al. 2008), and automated 
facial recognition has been in use for some years (Burrell 1998; Firth 2011).  In both cases, though, there is 
a paucity of published ethical analysis along the lines suggested in this paper.   
 
Secondly, while I have tried to focus on what I perceive to be the central ethical issues of the automation of 
surveillance, this paper is by no means exhaustive.  There are further issues such as the potential for abuse 
and function creep (Winner 1977).  Remaining with the example of SUBITO, could aspects of the 
technologies discussed in this paper be used to isolate particular ethnic or religious groups?  Are there other 
uses of the SUBITO technology beyond the recognition of unattended baggage, such as locating lost 
children?  If SUBITO were installed to locate terrorists but succeeded only in recognizing lost children and 
returning them to their parents, would this be a success sufficient to justify the installation of the system?  
These are questions which I have not had the space to develop in this paper, but which nonetheless require 
answering. 
 
Finally much of this paper has focussed on the impact that surveillance can have on the individual.  I have 
considered whether the individual may feel unfairly harassed or stigmatized, and how automation might 
impact upon the privacy of the surveilled subject.  What I have not done is to look at the impact of 
automating surveillance on society at large.  Authors such as David Lyon warn of the dangers of social 
sorting which arise from surveillance (Lyon 2002), while others discuss the chilling effects that can arise in 
society from high levels of surveillance (Michelman 2009).  These harms, if established, must be weighed 
against the efficacy of the surveillance, and perceptions of that efficacy.  While some work has been carried 
out on perceptions of efficacy (Gill & Spriggs 2005), none has yet addressed how that perception differs in 
cases of automated CCTV.  Finally, it is important to consider the ethical implications of the potential 
normalisation of surveillance practices.  Is it positive for society that we are, or at least presume we are, 
being watched over by a computer or a person?  Similarly, is it ethically advantageous that we depend upon 
automated surveillance rather than more traditional embodied surveillance in addressing societal concerns 
such as those outlined above? 
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